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Despite fundamental differences between the four countries and structural constraints of unipolarity that might have kept them from cooperating, the BRICs have surpassed most expectations in recent years in forming a nascent political grouping. On the foundation of other meetings between newly emerging powers, most importantly the trilateral Russia-India-China (RIC) arrangement, the BRIC foreign ministers began meeting in 2006. BRIC cooperation expanded to include two finance ministers’ summits, meetings of leaders, and a stand-alone BRIC leaders’ summit in June 2009, which produced a joint communiqué. Russia and Brazil have been the driving forces responsible for transforming the BRICs from an abstract financial concept into a genuine political grouping. However, the Chinese have also agreed to participate and cooperate. In a lengthy interview on the BRICs on the eve of the summit, Director-General Wu Hailong of the International Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the BRIC grouping as an “evolution from a hypothetical into a realistic platform for international cooperation.”

As the world’s second largest economy, a nuclear weapons state, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves, and a rising power whose influence is spreading across the globe, China has already been acknowledged as a superpower by the rest of the world. Having China as a partner has helped raise the profile of the other three BRICs partners, but China itself is less reliant on this association. However logical this cooperation may be, it is also costly and risky. As Chinese leaders’ time is limited and valuable, participation in meetings has an opportunity cost. Moreover, China also risks being perceived as participating in a political bloc designed to challenge and undermine the U.S. and the western liberal order.

For China, cooperation with the BRICs has occurred under the structural constraints of unipolarity, which provide it with an incentive to cooperate with the U.S. and ensure its behavior is not seen as a threat to which the hyper-sensitive hegemon might feel prompted to respond. However, China has benefited from its cooperation with the BRICs in significant ways. Looking forward, one of the major challenges for China in its engagement with the BRICs is how to maximize its benefits from cooperation while doing its utmost to make sure the U.S. does not perceive its cooperation with the BRICs as a threat. Zhao Gancheng, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, perfectly captures this dilemma in his analysis of BRIC cooperation. He argues that “[China’s] objective is through cooperation, to strengthen its position in the international system, but concomitantly to endeavor not to challenge the U.S. in a confrontational mode.” China does not see its cooperation with the BRICs as part of an anti-U.S. hard balancing coalition. Were anyone to attempt to move the BRICs in that direction, China would oppose the move, as would other member states. Despite the significance of BRIC cooperation, fundamental differences among the BRICs, the continued relevance of the U.S., and intra-BRIC competition and rivalry seriously limit the extent to which further BRIC cooperation can go. Looking to the future, as the U.S. declines and the BRICs continue to rise, it is very possible that intra-BRIC competition and rivalry will become fierce, further curbing cooperation among the member states.

U.S. policy is an important factor that could potentially overcome such limitations and push the BRICs toward more far-reaching cooperation. If the U.S. views limited BRIC cooperation as an anti-U.S. bloc and so adopts a more hostile policy towards this “alliance,” it may drive these countries closer together and thus create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Moreover, were the U.S. and other western countries to spurn BRIC demands for limited changes in the international order, the BRICs might well become disillusioned, see themselves as forced to mount a sweeping challenge, and seek to replace it with an order more suited to their interests. Thus far, this scenario seems unlikely. Western countries have started to show themselves to be more receptive to the idea of reforming the order and accommodating some of the BRIC demands. Although negotiation on reforming the international order is likely to be a drawn-out and difficult process, the willingness of western countries to entertain BRIC proposals should enhance the BRICs’ satisfaction with the international order, and so make them more likely to act as “responsible stakeholders.” That would put paid to the prospect of them challenging the status quo.

Looking ahead, China’s power will likely provide a challenge to BRIC cooperation and the BRICs as a grouping. Although the other three powers have garnered prestige by their association with the rising Chinese juggernaut, analysts have begun to suggest that China’s overwhelming power relative to the other three will eventually undermine the BRICs as a coherent grouping. For instance, recent unofficial calls for a Sino-American G2 designed to address global challenges and manage the global order suggest China is no longer an emerging power or a developing country. However much this may raise concern for BRIC coherence, China is already much more powerful than the other BRICs by most measures. Moreover, its advantages have not hobbled the positive momentum of BRIC cooperation. Besides, although foreign analysts may call for a G2, Premier Wen Jiabao and most Chinese experts have criticized the concept as inappropriate and unworkable, arguing that China is too weak to shoulder such responsibility whilst recognizing that endorsing the idea would harm China’s diplomacy, isolating it from the developing world. In fact, rather than being eager to be seen as part of a G2 leading and managing the world, China’s leaders are more than glad to continue to keep a relatively low profile as a developing country, to cooperate with other emerging powers, and to benefit from this cooperation, all the while studiously avoiding being seen as standing up to the United States.